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NETWORK STORIES 
JULIE E. COHEN* 
In 1962, Rachel Carson named the natural environment.1 Scientists were 
beginning to understand the complex web of ecological cause and effect; 
naming that web gave it independent existence and invested that existence with 
political meaning. In 1996, James Boyle named the cultural environment.  
Boyle’s act of naming was intended to jumpstart a political movement by 
appropriating the complex web of political meaning centered on the 
interdependency of environmental resources.2 
But naming, although important, is only a beginning. The example of the 
natural environment shows us that to build from a name to a movement 
requires two things. First, you have to do the science, which means generating 
detailed descriptions of how this environment works and what harms it. Second, 
you have to generate a normative theory powerful enough to overcome all 
competing narratives: a story about what makes this environment good. In the 
context of culture, however, there is an important difference: Cultural harm is 
less amenable to scientific proof. Cultural change may be empirically and 
anecdotally demonstrated, but cultural harm is in the eye of the beholder. This 
means that the normative theory needs to do heavier lifting. 
Proponents of cultural environmentalism, then, need to tackle the 
normative theory: to formulate a theory of “the network” as a whole that 
explains what makes it good. This is part of the point of Boyle’s original 
argument, and also the point of Susan Crawford’s excellent paper.3  Although 
carving out open enclaves is important, in the final analysis the cultural 
environment won’t be saved a piece at a time. It will be saved only when we 
recognize it as an entity that is more than just the sum of its parts. 
So what makes “the network” good?  Scholarly and popular discussion by 
and among open-network advocates suggests two answers: The network is us, 
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and the network that is us is a separate entity with a life and a liberty of its own. 
These answers seem to me to be inconsistent, and the second one strikes me as 
unsupportable in light of the first. If the network is us, then it isn’t a separate 
entity. It isn’t an ocean or any other natural ecology; it isn’t a separate, reified 
“space”; it isn’t a natural, preexisting entity at all, but a social one. To say that 
the network has a life of its own is to assert that there is a natural form of social 
ordering that the open Internet enables us to achieve. Both social theory and 
the new science of networks tell us that that is nonsense. The social formations 
that make up the network exhibit patterns and create path-dependencies. The 
network that Boyle and Crawford want to preserve is the social one that 
emerges when the new patterns of information flow enabled by the open 
Internet are layered over the patterns of flow that preceded it. The battle that is 
being fought in Washington is being fought because some powerful interests 
want to reconfigure the Internet to reinforce old patterns and path-
dependencies. Boyle and Crawford want to preserve its ability to enable new 
ones, and that is a goal I wholeheartedly support. 
Simply to say that the network is us, though, doesn’t tell us anything terribly 
specific about what makes it good. After all, a network of private internets 
would still be us.  Here we need to come back to the first inquiry that naming 
the cultural environment requires, which I characterized earlier as “doing the 
science” necessary to understand how the cultural environment works, and 
what harms it. This is, paradoxically, where the power of the environmental 
analogy ends; arguments from biodiversity and evolutionary theory will not do. 
What makes the network good can only be defined by generating richly detailed 
ethnographies of the experiences the network enables and the activities it 
supports, and articulating a normative theory to explain what is good, and 
worth preserving, about those experiences and activities. To say that the 
network is us is to say that the network is the sum of the experiences and 
actions of its individual, situated users, and of the patterns and flows that their 
interactions create. 
Here there is a further difficulty: How does one articulate a normative 
theory that preserves the link to experience, but at the same time convinces 
individuals to look beyond their own experiences? For users of the new private 
internets, what exactly will the shift to a private internet change (or threaten)? 
This question cannot be answered with rote invocation of the abstract concepts 
of “innovation” or “democracy.” If we are to take seriously the statement that 
the Internet is us, the answers we provide must remain systematically linked to 
the concrete realities of everyday experience. We must find a way to describe 
what an open network will allow users to encounter, and what it will enable 
them to create, that enables users to see beyond those immediacies to the larger 
patterns. 
The beginnings of one such description can be glimpsed around the edges of 
the more exceptionalist arguments offered by many open-network advocates, in 
the examples of dialogue, group formation, and group-based creativity that they 
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provide. The organizing principle underlying these examples is the emergence 
of groups and collectivities. But I want to suggest two more general and, I think, 
more apposite organizing principles: First, the network enables the creation of 
meaning, for both individuals and groups. What we need now is to dispense 
with the equally abstract romanticism of cyberspace exceptionalism and 
emphasize all of the concrete, everyday ways in which the open Internet enables 
the creation of meaning by and for real people in real spaces. Not bits, not 
abstract, disembodied information that has independent properties of flow, but 
meaning. Second, meaning emerges through and because of the opportunities 
for play that the network affords. Meaning emerges from the sorts of expression 
conventionally understood as expression—from the generation of dialogue on 
blogs, the formation of affinity groups, and the construction of authoritative 
texts on wikis. Private internets may enable the first activity, but will they also 
enable the latter two to the same extent?  Meaning emerges also from 
expression not conventionally understood as such—from what Edward Felten 
has called freedom to tinker4—and from fortuitous encounters within the 
network.  Will private internets enable these activities? 
Here we come to the crux of the matter: The telecommunication companies 
and cable companies aren’t stupid. They likely will enable all of these 
activities—at least at first, at least to a degree. How much enablement is 
required?  All protocols constrain.  What quantum of constriction equals a 
threat?  From the perspective of the individual, situated user, how would we 
know?  And why should we care?  How can we assess the options that we aren’t 
given? 
This is where we need stories—histories, romances, and myths—that remind 
people how meaning emerges from the uncontrolled and unexpected. We need 
stories that emphasize the meaning of being allowed to decide for ourselves 
what meaning to create, and how. We need stories that highlight the importance 
of cultural play, and of the spaces and contexts within which play occurs. Smart 
providers of private internet service know this too, and so the emergence of the 
rhetoric of play has led content providers and Internet access providers here 
and there to talk about constructing playgrounds.5  But playgrounds are for 
children. There is a middle space between the controlled disorder of the 
playground and outright chaos, where adults get to choose what they will hold 
meaningful, with whom they will associate, what they will build. That is the 
space of the open network, and that is the good we need to be discussing. 
Susan Crawford says that we all need to become telecommunications 
scholars, and maybe we do, but there are other resources that seem even more 
germane to the task of narrative-building that she envisions. Social and cultural 
theorists have long studied the interlocking systems of culture, and have 
 
 4. See generally Edward Felten, Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/ (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2006). 
 5. See, e.g., Packard Bell Playground, http://www.packardbell.co.uk/products/playground/ (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2006). 
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developed a keen appreciation of their interdependencies. We in the legal 
academy, with our commitments to abstract economic analysis or to equally 
abstract and decontextualized theories of rights and democratic discourse, have 
not looked closely enough at these resources.6  And perhaps the political 
movements to which we should be looking for inspiration include not only the 
environmental movement, but also social movements concerned more directly 
with relations of culture, identity, and equality.7  Perhaps, for example, we might 
build from the feminist rallying cry, “Get your laws off my body,” to our own: 
“Get your rules off my mind.” 
Finally, it is important to remember that the network is only as open as its 
endpoints will allow. A network neutrality mandate would not address another 
threat to openness within the cultural environment, one that in the end may be 
more serious. That is the threat of the trusted system—what I have called 
pervasively distributed copyright enforcement and what Jonathan Zittrain has 
called the advent of the information appliance.8 We know how to worry about 
monopolists we can see. We do not yet know how to worry about authorization 
and constraint embedded in the consumer technologies that operate at the 
endpoints of the network, and if those forces are deployed through ostensibly 
collaborative market processes there may be no visible entity or oligopoly at 
which to point. 
Telecommunications law has little to say about the sort of control that 
trusted systems enable. Addressing this threat to the cultural environment also 
requires more than a theory founded on the four regulatory modalities that 
Larry Lessig so perceptively identified for us, and that are of most direct and 
instrumental interest to policymakers.9  Here again, to understand how control 
at the ends structures the experience of the network, we need a social theory: 
one that situates regulation by protocol within the context of social and cultural 
ordering more generally. And here again, the theory needs to be firmly 
grounded in the everyday experience of network users, and in the patterns of 
interaction that the network enables or forbids.10 
In sum, generating a normative theory of the open network requires more 
than a theory of intellectual property or telecommunications, and “doing the 
science” of cultural environmentalism requires more than appropriation of the 
environmental metaphor. Cultural environmentalism is like environmentalism, 
 
 6. I consider what copyright scholarship can learn from social and cultural theory in Julie E. 
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Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007). 
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but it is also different. If it is to succeed, cultural environmentalism must 
grapple directly with culture. In cultural environmentalism’s next decade, I very 
much hope that we will make that our shared project. 
